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1. Introduction 
Starting transition since 1978, China has achieved a stirring economic success with 
average GDP growth rate of 8.3 percent (World Bank, 2000) and accounting for 25 
percent share of global economic growth in 1995-2002 (Economist, 2003). 
Remarkable economic performance boosted the per capita GDP by about 22 times of 
379 RMB in 1978 to 8184 RMB in 2002. Contrary to Wagner’s Law, which suggests 
that public sector augment in accordance with increasing economic growth and per 
capita income, government expenditure relative to total GDP in China is, yet, 
shrinking. As shown in Figure 1, the ratio of government expenditure1 to GDP 
dropped from 31% in 1978 to the rock bottom of 12% in 1995 and 1996 despite recent 
recovery of 21% in 2002. It remains, yet, strikingly lower compared to the average 
level of 28 OECD countries, 41%, and even the lowest member, Korea, of 25% 
(OECD, 2002). An interesting question arises, especially, when the public sector has 
undergoing a continuous growth in most Western economies since World War I, why 
does China, a communist country, moves in the opposite direction? 
 
[insert figure 1 about here] 
 
Following Adolph Wagner, volumes of works exist to deal with the trends, causes, 
and effects of expanding public sector in Western economies, such as Peacock and 
Wiseman (1961), Musgrave (1959; 1969), Bird (1970), Meltzer and Richard (1981), 
Krusell and Rios-Rull (1999) and Dudley and Witt (2004), etc. However, few 
researches pay particular attention to China’s odd trend of shrinkage of government 
size except that some only touches upon this point. Based on our related literatures 
review, several possible explanations might be raised. Firstly, the demand side 
approach attributes to the transition process of China from a central-planned to a 
market economy resulting in the fade out of excessive government intervention. 
Naturally, the government expenditure is cut down thanks to massive private saving 
and investment in various economic fields. Secondly, from the supply side, the reform 
of budget system changes the structure of government revenue source and then 
constrains government financial capacity. Unlike pre-reform budget system mainly 
relies on profit remittance from state-owned enterprises, tax collection now is the 
major means to finance government activities. While an undeveloped tax 
administration and lack of voluntary tax compliance severely hamper levies of 
government revenue. A third argument might be the problem of statistic technique in 
that a large size of extrabudgetary, even off-budgetary, expenditure is not shown up in 
official statistic data2. Thus, the de facto government size should be larger than that in 
Figure 1. 
                                                        
1 Chinese public budget system includes extrabudgetary revenue and expenditure, originated in 1950 as a 
supplementary to the budgetary part. The data of the extrabudgetary revenue and expenditure only started in 1982 
since the statistic reporting scheme was established then. Hereafter the government revenue and expenditure refers 
to the budgetary one.  
2 See footnote 1. 
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In addition to preceding three plausible explanations, we argue that fiscal 
decentralization also induces a smaller government in transition China. In contrast 
with traditional public finance theory modeling government as a benevolent despotic 
agency subject to public interests, Brennan and Buchanan (1980) depict the 
government as a monolithic Leviathan to maximize its revenue by exploiting tax base 
to the maximum extent. From such perspective, they claim that the fiscal 
decentralization is a powerful institutional constraint on the reach of the state. Thus, 
an implication is that “total government intrusion into the economy should be smaller, 
ceteris paribus, the greater the extent to which taxes and expenditures are 
decentralized…” (p.185).  
 
Considering numerous empirical tests on Leviathan hypothesis have been 
conducted but with conflicting results, we intend not only to address the problem why 
government size is curtailed in China, but also to offer a new window to examine the 
Leviathan hypothesis by analyzing time series and cross section data of China due to 
following reasons: i) a de facto fiscal decentralization in China is accredited by 
numerous scholars and researchers (e.g. Montinola et al, 1995; Qian and Weingast, 
1996,1997; Weingast, 1995); ii) the absence of representative democracy lends a great 
opportunity for testing whether fiscal decentralization is another effective institutional 
arrangement to curb government expansion; and iii) China’s sheer size permits a 
cross-section analysis on subnational level.  
 
The paper will proceed as follows. Next section sets out the three possible 
explanations of a shrinking Chinese government. Section 3 presents a survey of 
empirical literature on Leviathan hypothesis and our approach to China case, followed 
by the section of methodology and data. Section 5 provides the empirical results of 
time series and cross section analysis. The final section draws the conclusion. 
 
2. Changing public sector in transition China 
2.1 The demand side 
Given the transition nature, the developing market economy forces government to 
retreat from most economic fields (e.g. Walder, 1996; Naughton, 1995). Price 
liberation and privatization have toppled traditional dominance of government in 
economy and unleashed dramatic growth of non-state sector. In 1999, the non-state 
share of gross output value of industry (GOVI) increased more than 3 times of the 
1980 level from 24% to 74%. And the non-state percentage of fixed investment also 
expanded from only 18% in 1980 to 47% in 1999 (Figure 2). As a result, to meet the 
shrinking demand for government intervention in economy, the government 
expenditure on economic construction scaled to GDP has steadily declined since the 
transition. Dropped from 20% in 1978, it hit the bottom of 5% in 1996, which mainly 
contributed to the descent of government outlay in GDP. Meanwhile, the successive 
cut of expenditure on national defense from 5% in 1978 to 1% in 1996 was also 
responsible for that. Recently, a slight rise of expenditure on all functions, such as 
economic, social, cultural and education, administration and miscellaneous, pulled the 
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government share back from the bottom of 12% in 1995 and 1996 to 21% of GDP in 
2002 (Figure 3).  
 
[insert figure 2 and 3 about here] 
 
 
2.2 The supply side 
A series of fiscal reforms have rebuilt revenue structure of government indicating 
the transformation from a socialist “owner-state” (Campbell, 1996) surviving upon 
controlled resources to a modern “tax-state” (Schumpeter, 1918) subject to its tax 
capability to extract surplus from economic sectors. Before the transition, Chinese 
government revenue largely relied on state-owned enterprises (SOEs) who not only 
remitted their profits, but also paid taxes based on a simple socialist tax system. As 
shown in Figure 4, revenue remitted from SOEs made up of 51% of total government 
revenue in 1978. Yet, the booming non-state enterprises eroded the previous 
dominance of SOEs in economy and forced them to become loss-making during 
market competition. In 1985, the subsidy to those loss-making SOEs held 25% of 
total government revenue, about 13 times more than the revenue from those profitable. 
SOEs turned out to be a heavy financial burden of the government.  
 
[insert figure 4 about here] 
 
On the other hand, the new tax system introduced western taxes like VAT in 1994, 
broadened tax base to non-state sector, shifted the focus of tax collection and 
administration to a large number of small-size enterprises and individuals and made 
taxes principal revenue source (nearly 100% or more since 1985), which extremely 
challenged government’s tax capability (e.g. Wong, 1997; World Bank, 2002). 
Moreover, the lack of traditional tax compliance of private sector and individuals 
exacerbated such problems. Consequently, The financial capability of government 
was severely constrained by the inadaptable tax system. The ratio of total fiscal 
revenue to GDP plummeted from 31% in 1978 to 11% in 1995 and 1996 and recently 
recovered to 18% in 2002. And the fiscal deficit peaked in 1979 at 3.4% of GDP and 
controlled around 1% for several years but was enlarging again since 1998. The fiscal 
deficit was 3% of GDP in 2002 (Figure 5). 
 
[insert figure 5 about here] 
 
2.3 The hidden figures 
The existence of extensive extrabudgetary or even off-budgetary activities implies 
that the actual amount of government revenue and expenditure is much larger than 
those budgetary figures (e.g. Wong, 1998; Fan, 1998; Eckaus, 2003; Krug et al, 2005). 
Originated in 1950 to mitigate the scarcity of local financial resource, extrabudgetary 
revenue consists of administrative service charges, funds, and surcharges on taxes 
levied by the State Council, the provincial government or corresponding financial and 
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price regulation departments. It remained a minor part before 1980s but experienced a 
vicious spiral after that. In 1978, the extrabudgetary revenue possessed 10% of GDP 
and escalated to 17% during 1980s accounting for half of total actual government 
revenue (Figure 6). In addition, volumes of off-budgetary revenues and expenditures 
escaped from the public budget system and excluded from the budgetary figures. Thus, 
the actual government size of China is, to a large extent, underestimated.  
 
[insert figure 6 about here] 
 
 
3. Leviathan and decentralized China 
3.1 Leviathan theory 
In addition to preceding three explanations, we approach the shrinking Chinese 
government size by Leviathan theory. In Brennan and Buchanan’s model (1980), the 
government consists of self-interest politicians and bureaucrats who maximize their 
discretionary resources and powers by all means so as to create the 
revenue-maximizing nature of a Leviathan government. Moreover, akin to a 
monopoly firm in the market, government monopolizes the provision of public goods 
and service, thereby exploits its citizenry-consumers to the extreme extent through 
maximized taxation. The democratic electoral process is, therefore, designed to hold 
back government’s latent “grabbing hand” at the post-constitutional level. Indeed, 
underpinning the democracy, the commonly believed majority rule “embodies no 
effective constraint on the exercise of government powers at all ” (1980:7, italic in 
original; see also Downs, 1957). Thus, as an alternative institutional arrangement, 
fiscal federalism may actually constrain government’s insatiable appetite for fiscal 
expansion thanks to its two major merits: information revelation and competition (e.g. 
Musgrave, 1959; 1969; Oates, 1972). On the one hand, along the vertical government 
hierarchy, decentralized decision-making (Hayek, 1945) enables citizens more 
effectively check and balance on government coercive powers to tax in that the 
principal-agent problem might be better addressed by sufficient information 
revelation under closer distance between lower level government and its 
constituencies. Thus, the share of lower-level government in total government 
revenues and expenditures captures the degree of decentralized authority from 
upper-level. On the other hand, Tieboutian mobility (1956) of individuals and factors 
introduces horizontal interjurisdictional competition for fiscal resources and such 
“voting by feet” forces government to be a rational public goods provider 
economizing on relative tax cost. Any excessive tax burden would, obviously, induce 
massive migrations of tax bases to other regions with less tax levies. The number of 
rival jurisdictions, hence, determines the degree of intergovernmental competition. 
Consequently, two hypothesis are developed:   
 
Decentralization hypothesis: The more decentralized fiscal authority to lower-level 
government, the smaller is the total government size.  
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Fragmentation hypothesis: The more rival jurisdictions, the smaller is the total 
government size.  
 
Furthermore, due to the mobility of tax base, economies of scale and scope, fiscal 
equity ground and spillover effect, the vertical tax structure is known as the 
tax-assignment problem (e.g. McLure, 1983; Musgrave, 1997; Oates, 1999) in which 
central government levies most taxes and transfers to local government according to 
certain criteria or object. Yet, Brennan and Buchanan (1980) acknowledge that such 
intergovernmental collusion would moderate the interjurisdictional competitive 
pressures and lessen the effective constraint of fiscal decentralization on government 
size “because it subverts the primary purpose of federalism, which is to create 
competition between jurisdictions (p.183)”. Measured by intergovernmental grants, 
collusion hypothesis implies a larger government extraction. 
 
Collusion hypothesis: The more intergovernmental grants, the larger is the total 
government size.  
 
3.2 A survey of empirical literature 
Although Leviathan theory has the sound theoretical roots, numerous empirical 
studies headed by Oates have shown inconsistent evidences at national, subnational 
and/or local level (Table 1)3. Based on a cross-section sample of 57 countries, Oates 
(1972) conducted a simple regression of government size (share of tax revenues in 
national income) on decentralization (central government tax revenue as a fraction of 
total tax revenues) and found a significant inverse relation that increased 
decentralization resulted in a larger government sector. After controlling variable of 
income level for Wagner’s Law, the coefficient remained negative but statistically 
insignificant, which lent no support to the decentralization hypothesis. In 1985, Oates 
used 43 IMF countries sample and again found no statistically significant association 
between fiscal decentralization and government size. Yet, the empirical result verified 
the collusion hypothesis that relatively heavy intergovernmental grants induce larger 
public sectors. To address the latent unreliability of IMF data, Heil (1991) used two 
comparison samples of 22 OECD and 39 IMF countries. In addition to Ordinary Least 
Squares technique, he also ran the Two-stage Least Squares regression by 
constructing federal structure, literacy rate and gross exports as percentage of GDP as 
instrumental variables. In all cases, no significant impact of fiscal decentralization on 
government size was obtained at the national level. Moreover, Stein (1999) observed 
relatively larger governments in fiscal decentralized Latin America, particularly, when 
subnational governments enjoyed extensive vertical imbalance, discretional transfer 
and borrowing autonomy. Yet, in Moesen and van Cauwenberge (2000), 
decentralization variable was matched by local tax autonomy, thereby excluded 
intergovernmental grants and local borrowing, i.e., subnational government taxes as a 
percentage of total government expenditures. The estimation result of 19 OECD 
                                                        
3 The survey of previous empirical literatures is based on Shadbegian (1999) and Feld (2003).  
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countries supported Leviathan hypothesis that a decentralized tax authority tended to 
reduce overall government size. Rodden (2003) and Anderson and van Den Berg 
(1998) confirmed this point as well. Furthermore, Rodden provided empirical 
evidence that decentralization accompanied by intergovernmental transfers produced 
a larger government. Different from aggregate government size as dependent variable 
in customarily analyses, Jin and Zou (2002) explored how government size at 
different level was influenced by different fiscal decentralization measures. Using 
panel data of 17 industrial and 15 developing countries from 1980-1994, they found 
that: i) expenditure decentralization resulted in smaller national governments, larger 
subnational governments and larger overall government size; ii) revenue 
decentralization increased subnational government size but much more reduced 
national one, thereby cut down aggregate government size; and iii) intergovernmental 
grants enlarged government size at all levels. Marlow (1988) initially performed a 
time-series regression on 1946-1985 data of the United State and found strong 
supporting evidence for the decentralization hypothesis. Later, Grossman (1989a; 
1989b), using the same data set, verified that decentralization (share of subnational 
expenditure in total government expenditure) curtailed government spending (total 
government expenditure relative to GNP) while federal-to-state grants encouraged 
government expansion. Similarly, Australia (1950-1984) and Canada (1958-1987) 
data were tested in Grossman (1992) and Grossman and West (1994), respectively. In 
the former case, the collusion hypothesis was demonstrated but not the 
decentralization one; while in the latter case, both hypotheses were supported. Kwon 
(2003) analyzed time-series data of Korea from 1979 to 2001 and obtained supporting 
findings as well.  
  
Table 1 Empirical literature of Leviathan hypotheses 
 
At the subnational level, Oates (1985) regressed cross-section data (1977) of 48 
contiguous US states. In his estimated specification, the dependent variable was the 
state government size measured by aggregate state-local tax receipts as a fraction of 
personal income and his aimed explanatory variables included the state share of 
state-local revenues and expenditures (decentralization hypothesis) and number of 
local government units (fragmentation hypothesis) while intergovernmental grants as 
a percentage of state-local general revenues (collusion hypothesis), together with per 
capita personal income, population and urbanization ratio, was constructed as a 
control variable. Neither of the regression results showed statistically significant 
association between explanatory variable and dependent variable. Nonetheless, 
collusion hypothesis was partially supported by one of three equations in which a 
positive and statistically significant coefficient was resulted. While in the following 
empirical studies based on the same level, the decentralization hypothesis was 
supported by Wallis and Oates (1988), Joulfain and Marlow (1990; 1991), and 
Shadbegian (1999) and the collusion hypothesis was supported by Raimondo (1989), 
Grossman (1989) and Shadbegian (1999). With regard to fragmentation hypothesis, 
Nelson (1986; 1987) found general-purpose local government units increased 
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intergovernmental competition and then restricted the state-local government size. In 
addition to US states data, de Mello (2001) used 38 rayons (subnational) data in 
Moldova that provided supporting evidence for above three hypotheses. Feld et al 
(2003) also lent support to decentralization and collusion hypothesis except 
fragmentation one based evidence from 26 Swiss cantons (subnational).  
 
Empirical studies at local level mainly concentrate on counties and municipalities 
in SMSAs of the United States. Forbes and Zampelli (1989) reject fragmentation 
hypothesis with a positive and significant effect of the number of counties on county 
government size, using sample of 345 counties in 157 SMSAs. Zax (1989) expanded 
sample to 3022 counties and Eberts and Gronberg (1988) used 2900 counties, both 
observing that increased general-purpose local government units were likely to reduce 
government size. Sjoquist (1982), Schneider (1986), and Eberts and Gronberg (1990) 
also found supporting evidence for fragmentation hypothesis at municipalities or 
SMSAs level. A more recent investigation undertaken by Campbell (2004) suggested 
different government levels matter how decentralization impact on government size: i) 
increased decentralization of expenditures tends to decrease municipal expenditures 
while have no influence on county expenditures; ii) increased fragmentation reduced 
county expenditures but has no effect on municipal expenditures.  
 
3.3 Decentralized China 
 Considering the mixed empirical results, further study based on new data set is 
warranted to unravel the contradiction in the existing literature. China may be the 
right case. Firstly, a de facto fiscal decentralization has been resulted during last two 
decades. Local interests for development, together with the policy legacy of rural 
autarky in Mao era, accelerate the formation of a Chinese style of fiscal federalism 
(e.g. Montinola et al, 1995; Qian and Weingast, 1996,1997; Weingast, 1995). Since 
transition in 1978, China has undertaken decentralization through a series of tax and 
fiscal reforms: tax-for-profit reform (1983-84), fiscal contracting system (1985-93) 
and 1994 tax-sharing system, etc (see World Bank, 1990; 1995; 2002; Wong, 1995; 
1997; 1998). Under the 1985 fiscal contracting system, central government assigned 
fixed revenue-remittance contract and made local government de facto residual 
claimant intensively pursuing revenue surplus. As shown in Figure 7, central share of 
budgetary revenue went on diminishing during 1985-93, which dropped 16 percent 
from 38% to 22%. The ratio of central to total budgetary expenditure fell from 40% to 
28%. The continuous shrinkage of central revenue and expenditure provoked a tax 
reform in 1994, aimed to arrest the declining trend and recentralize the fiscal capacity. 
The result was dramatic that central share of budgetary revenue boosted into 56% of 
total in 1994 and kept average 51% recent years. Yet, on the extrabudgetary revenue 
and expenditure side, remarkable decentralization was undergoing, particularly after 
1992, that local share of extrabudgetary revenue and expenditure rocketed from 56% 
in 1992 to highest 95% in 1998 and remained average 92% in 2001 (Figure 8).  
 
[insert figure 7 and 8 about here] 
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Secondly, as Brennan and Buchanan point out, the fiscal decentralization may 
effectively constrain government’s power to tax even when the democratic monitor 
fails. From this point of view, the absence of representative democracy in China offers 
a great opportunity for testing such hypothesis. Thirdly, China’s sheer size allows a 
cross-section analysis on sub-national level. Its subnational government hierarchy 
consists of 31 provincial level government units, 333 prefectures, 2,074 counties, and 
44,741 townships in 2000.4 
 
4. Methodology and data 
We intend to test the impact of decentralization, fragmentation, and collusion on 
government size and thereby address the problem of shrinking public sectors and 
inconsistency of Wagner’s Law in China. Time series and cross-section regression 
will be performed using national and provincial data set, respectively. 
 
4.1 Time series regression 
Following Marlow (1988), a time series regression will firstly be conducted based 
on the data of aggregate central and subnational levels of Chinese government from 
1953 to 2002, in which the subnational level includes province, prefecture, county and 
township. The dependent variable (GOV) is the government size measured by ratio of 
total government expenditure at all aggregate levels to Gross Domestic Production. 
The explanatory variable, decentralization (DEC), is the ratio of total subnational 
expenditure to total government expenditure. The control variables (xδ) consist of 
population, per capita GDP and the degree of urbanization in accordance with 
previous empirical literatures5. One special control variable added to the estimation 
equation is the ratio of expenditure on economic construction to total government 
outlay in order to capture the transition nature of Chinese government after late 1970s. 
Such variable indicates to what extent government intervenes in economic activities.  
The single estimation equation is as follows: 
(1) 
 
where the descriptions of variables are given in the table 2. 
 
Table 2 Variable descriptions 
 
4.2 Data 
Data of PCGDP, GOV, DEC, and EXPECO are from China Statistical Yearbook 
2001-2003, Table 3-1, 8-8 and 8-14; POP and URB 1978-2002 are from China 
Statistical Yearbook 2003 Table 4-1; POP 1953-1977 are calculated based on data of 
total GDP and per capita GDP from China Statistical Yearbook 2001 Table 3-1; URB 
                                                        
4 Provincial level government units refer to 22 provinces (sheng), 5 autonomous regions (zizhiqu), and 4 
autonomous municipalities (zhixiasi, Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Chongqing). Taiwan province and two special 
administrative regions, Hong Kong and Macao are excluded. 
5 We substitute per capita GDP for per capita income due to data unavailability of the latter. 
ttt uxDECGOV +++= δββ 10
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1953-1977 are calculated based on data from China Statistical Yearbook 1982, p.89 
and Population Census of Government 1953, 1964, 1982, 1990 and 2000. 
 
Table 3 Summary statistics 
 
Table 3 reports the basic summary statistics for the variables in time series 
regression. The government size (GOV) has a mean value of 24% and ranges from 
12% in 1995 to 44% in 1960. The decentralization extent (DEC) fluctuates 
remarkably from 23% in 1955 to 73% in 1996 with a mean of 52%. Although 
population increases more than double of 580 million in 1953 to 1285 million in 2002, 
the per capita GDP rockets approximately sixtyfold of 142 RMB in 1953 to 8184 
RMB in 2002. The maximum value of urbanization degree is 39% in 2002, 26 percent 
high than that in 1953. A considerable decrease of government expenditure on 
economic construction from 72% to 30% indicates the diminishing intervention of 
government in economy.  
 
4.3 Cross-section regression 
The cross-section samples are 31 China’s provinces and the time point is 2000. The 
dependent variable (GOV) in the specification is ratio of total provincial and 
subprovincial government expenditure to provincial GDP6. As for the independent 
variable, we employ two different measures: the ratio of subprovincial government 
expenditure to total (DECE) and numbers of local government units of each province 
(NUMLG). In accordance with decentralization and fragmentation hypothesis, the 
DECE indicates the vertical decentralization while NUMLG reflects the degree of 
interjurisdictional competition at horizontal fragmentation dimension. Suggested by 
Grossman (1989) to test the influence of intergovernmental collusion on the 
dependent variable, the GRANTS is the share of total central grants to province in 
aggregate provincial government expenditure. Four control variables are added into 
the specification. Two variables control for the local preferences for public services: 
population and per capita income7. The variable illiterate represents the mobility of 
population that implies a relatively high percentage illiterate population with a low 
mobility. The variable SOE capture the variation of influence of State-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) on local economic development, which refers to the ratio of 
industrial output value of SOE’s to total gross industrial output value of each 
province.  
The single estimation equation is as follows: 
(2) 
 
where the Xk denotes independent variables and xδ denotes control variables. 
Descriptions of variables are given in the table 4. 
                                                        
6 Here the expenditure refers to actual budget in 2000. 
7 Per capita income is calculated on the data of per capita income in urban area and rural area and percentage of 
population residing in urban area of each province.  
kkk uxXGOV +++= δββ 10
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Table 4 Variable descriptions 
 
4.4 Data 
Data of GOV and GRANTS are from various Provincial Actual Budget Sheets, 
China Financial Statistical Yearbook 2001; DECE are from various Provincial 
Financial Statistical Yearbooks 2001 and Provincial Budget Reports 2000; NUMLG, 
POP, PCI, ILLITERATE and SOE are from China Statistical Yearbook 2001 Table 1-1, 
4-3, 4-9, 4-12, 10-12, 10-18, 13-3. 
 
Table 5 Summary statistics 
 
Table 5 reports the basic summary statistics for the variables in cross-section 
regression. An astonishing diversity exists among different localities. The government 
size (GOV) reaches high as 65% of total GDP in Tibet and low as 9% in Jiangsu. By 
contrast, the decentralization extent (DEC) ranges from 85% in Jiangsu and 33% in 
Tibet with a mean of 64%. Sichuan has the most local government units of 180 and 
the least province is Beijing and Tianjin of 18. Central grants obtain 83 percent of 
total government expenditure in Tibet, exceeding the average level by 44 percent and 
69 percent high than the minimum ratio of 14% in Beijing. The maximum population 
is 92,560 thousand in Henan and the minimum 2,620 thousand in Tibet. Per capita 
annual income shows a large inequality among different regions by highest 11,002 
RMB in Shanghai and lowest 2266 RMB in Gansu with an average of 4,004 RMB. 
The illiterate ratio ranges from 4% in Guangxi to 33% in Tibet. As one of the most 
underdevelopment provinces, Qinghai remains a high ratio of SOEs which dominate 
local economy by 89 percentage of gross industrial output value. In Guangdong 
province, SOEs only retain a quarter. The average level of SOEs’ influence on local 
economy is still relatively high at 60% in 2000. The appendix provides the data 
sources. 
 
5. Empirical results 
5.1 Time series regression 
The Ordinary Least Squares regression results of equation (1) are reported in Table 
6. As in Oates (1985), a logistic transformation of GOV is used to allow the value of 
dependent variable to range over the entire real line. The Eq 1.1 is a simple regression 
of government size (GOV) on decentralization (DEC), which shows a strong 
statistically significant and negative relation. When control for other variables in Eq 
1.2, the decentralization remain the same effect on government size.  
Since Eq 1.2 suffers the problem of serial correlation, Eq 1.3 is adjusted for 
first-order serial correlation by using Hildreth-Lu technique and passes the Q-statistic 
test on the residual errors. The coefficient of decentralization stays statistically 
significant and negative against the dependent variable. Thus, other things equal, the 
more fiscally decentralized a government, the smaller is its size, which empirically 
supports the Leviathan hypothesis. The significant and negative sign of population 
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indicates that the growth of public goods and services drops far behind that of 
population. Consistent with Wagner’s Law, the per capita GDP has a positive 
association with government size but is not significantly different from zero in both 
Eq 1.2 and Eq 1.3. At 10 percent significant level, urbanization exerts a positive 
influence on government size suggesting large-scale government expenditure for 
investment in public infrastructure, city maintenance, compensation for peasants, etc., 
in China. The expenditure on economic construction obviously retains positive 
correlation with government size for an economic-intervention-oriented government 
is thirsty for financial sources not only from supply side to sustain enormous subsidies 
but also from demand side to appease its nature to expand.  
 
Table 6 OLS results of time series 
 
5.2 Cross-section regression 
 The procedure is similar with that in earlier section where a logistic transformation is 
adopted on the dependent variable and Table 7 presents the regression results. The 
first three equations are simple regression of government size on DECE, NUMLG and 
GRANTS, respectively. All three independent variables hold a strong statistically 
significant coefficient consistent with Leviathan prediction: decentralization and 
fragmentation negatively against GOV and intergovernmental grants positively with 
GOV. Particularly, the explanatory power of DECE and GRANTS is relatively 
substantial which is able to explain 36 and 51 percent of the variation in the provincial 
government size.  
 
The last three equations control for other variables and all use the White covariance 
estimator in place of the standard OLS formula correcting the heteroskedasticity 
problem. After such processing, the vertical decentralization remains negative effect 
on government size but statistically significant at 8% level, suggesting fiscal 
decentralization could rein in government’s unbounded stretch and basically 
supporting the Leviathan hypothesis. The number of local government units become 
positive when control for other factors but statistically insignificant, which implies 
current division of administration area is, to a large extent, based on geographical 
principle and not for the sake of introducing interjurisdictional competition. Another 
implication is that increasing local government units alone cannot serve the purpose 
of competition effectively and, on the contrary, induces the expansion of government 
size. In Eq.2.6, GRANTS still retain a positive sign and at statistically significant 11% 
level. Other things equal, central grants to provinces enlarge their government size.  
 
 Population exhibits a negative and statistically significant association with 
government size in last three equations that further reveals that an insufficient local 
public good and service is provided relative to a huge population base in China. 
Coefficients of per capita income are predicted same as Wagner’s Law although their 
value is near zero. Accordingly, an increase in per capita income would boost 
government size. Three strong statistically significant and positive signs of the 
  13
percentage of illiterate population indicate government prefers to tax most on its 
immobile population. The variable SOE keeps a significant and positive effect on 
government size in that most loss-making SOEs survive on government subsidies. 
Then, the more SOEs each province maintains in hand, the more financial resources 
they absorb, other things equal, the larger government size results.   
Table 7 LS results of cross section 
 
6. Conclusion 
 This paper offers a new data set and window to empirically test Leviathan theory in 
the sense of China’s transition economy and also explain the superficial contradiction 
of China’s empirical fact with Wagner’s Law. Combining time series and 
cross-section regression analysis and various variables used by previous empirical 
studies, we test the Leviathan hypothesis for vertical decentralization, horizontal 
fragmentation and intergovernmental collusion at national and provincial level, 
respectively. The results demonstrate that fiscal decentralization in terms of vertical 
expenditure decentralization imposes constraints on government size at both national 
and provincial level. Without a traditional democratic monitoring process in China, 
fiscal decentralization assumes as a powerful institutional restriction to curtail the 
government size and foster the market development. Yet, we could not find an 
empirical support of the fragmentation dimension of fiscal decentralization curbing 
growth of provincial government size. Moreover, the intergovernmental collusion 
hypothesis is empirically verified that such institutional rearrangement of tax power 
would weaken interjurisdicational competition and, ultimately, the effect of fiscal 
decentralization. Furthermore, in addition to three plausible explanations for a 
shrinking public sector in China, we offer an alternative approach that fiscal 
decentralization contributes to restrict government size as well.  
 
 Additionally, some interesting findings present helpful policy implications. From 
increasing population perspective, the supply of public goods and services is 
insufficient either at national or provincial level in China. If Chinese government 
failed to address such problem, it would endanger sustainable development of future 
China. The positive relation between illiterate ratio and government size fully attests a 
theorem in public finance: immobile factor is more vulnerable to tax. The illiterate 
population with relatively less mobility induces government to aggravate their tax 
burden. The loss-making SOEs are draining government budget and blocking the 
allocation of financial resource into other imperative public services, like education, 
social security, etc.  
 
 Overall, we find empirical support for Leviathan theory although it is not conclusive. 
With regard to almost two decades searching for Leviathan, our contribution only 
provides an empirical result based on a new but particular case of transition China. 
Further empirical studies should be done to measure government size, fiscal 
decentralization and interjurisdictional competition more precisely. And new data set 
is also helpful to address such “fussy issue”.    
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Appendix 
Sample of provinces, China: 
East Middle West 
Beijing Jilin Guangxi 
Tianjin Heilongjiang Guizhou 
Hebei Shanxi Yunnan 
Liaoning Inner Mongolia Tibet 
Shandong Jiangxi Shaanxi 
Shanghai Anhui Gansu 
Jiangsu Henan Qinghai 
Zhejiang Hubei Ningxia 
Fujian Hunan Xinjiang 
Guangdong Chongqing  
Hainan Sichuan  
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Table 2 Variable descriptions 
Variable Descriptions 
GOVt Ratio of total government expenditure to GDP in time t  
DECt Ratio of total subnational expenditure to total government expenditure 
in time t  
POPt Population in time t (in millions) 
PCGDPt Per capita GDP in time t (in RMB) 
URBt Percentage of population residing within urban area in time t  
EXPECOt Ratio of total expenditure on economic construction to total government 
expenditure in time t  
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Table 3 Summary statistics 
Variable Mean Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. 
GOV 0.24 0.44 0.12 0.07 
DEC 0.52 0.73 0.23 0.14 
POP 939.05 1284.53 580.28 224.52 
PCGDP 1601.12 8184.00 142.00 2335.64 
URB 0.22 0.39 0.13 0.07 
EXPECO 0.52 0.72 0.30 0.09 
Observations 50 
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Table 4 Variable descriptions 
Variable Descriptions 
GOVk Ratio of total provincial and subprovincial government expenditure to 
GDP in province k  
DECEk Ratio of subprovincial government expenditure to total provincial and 
subprovincial government expenditure in province k 
NUMLGk Number of counties and city districts in province k 
GRANTSk Ratio of central grants to total provincial and subprovincial government 
expenditure in province k 
POPk Population in province k (in thousands) 
PCIk Per capita income in province k (in RMB) 
Illiteratek Percentage of illiterate population in province k  
SOEk Ratio of industrial output value of SOE’s to total gross industrial output 
value in province k 
 
  22
Table 5 Summary statistics 
Variable Mean Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. 
GOV 0.18 0.65 0.09 0.11 
DECE 0.64 0.85 0.33 0.14 
NUMLG 92.29 180.00 18.00 44.78 
GRANTS 0.39 0.83 0.14 0.17 
POP 40718.71 92560.00 2620.00 26455.90 
PCI 4004.31 11002.39 2266.05 2062.05 
ILLITERATE 0.08 0.33 0.04 0.06 
SOE 0.60 0.89 0.25 0.16 
Observations 31 
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Table 6 OLS results of time series. Dependent variable: GOV 
  Eq1.1 Eq1.2 Eq1.3 
Independent variable    
DEC -2.011*** 
(-6.775) 
-1.339*** 
(-3.568) 
-0.799** 
(-2.032) 
Control variable    
POP  -0.001** 
(-2.620) 
-0.001** 
(-2.127) 
PCGDP  3.52E-05 
(1.122) 
4.66E-06 
(0.093) 
URB  2.946* 
(1.682) 
4.410* 
(1.764) 
EXPECO  3.690*** 
(7.758) 
3.268*** 
(6.082) 
Constant  -0.153 
(-0.957) 
-2.365 
(-6.684) 
-0.824 
(-4.300) 
Observations 50 50 49 
adjusted R2 0.478 0.834 0.595 
Notes: 
a. t-statistics in parentheses. 
b. * statistically significant at 10% level; ** statistically significant at 5% level; *** 
statistically significant at 1% level. 
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Table 7 LS results of cross section. Dependent variable: GOV 
  Eq2.1 Eq2.2 Eq2.3 Eq2.4 Eq2.5 Eq2.6 
Independent variable       
-2.591***   -0.630*   DECE 
(-4.185)   (-1.810)   
NUMLG  -0.006***   0.001  
  (-3.335)   (0.841)  
GRANTS   2.505***   1.013 
   (5.585)   (1.638) 
Control variable       
  -4.80E-06** -8.70E-06*** -5.45E-06**POP 
 
  (-2.061) (-2.774) (-2.524) 
  6.16E-05* 7.43E-05** 9.91E-05**PCI 
 
  (2.021) (2.324) (2.318) 
  6.387*** 6.465*** 5.370*** ILLITERATE 
 
  (6.448) (5.515) (4.652) 
  1.114*** 1.179*** 0.917* SOE 
 
  (3.186) (2.906) (1.998) 
0.039 -1.102 -2.580 -2.455 -2.920 -3.170 Constant  
(0.097) (-5.087) (-13.675) (-6.709) (-8.221) (-7.871) 
Observations 31 31 31 31 31 31 
adjusted R2 0.355 0.151 0.502 0.851 0.841 0.852 
Notes: 
a. t-statistics in parentheses. 
b. * statistically significant at 10% level; ** statistically significant at 5% level; *** statistically 
significant at 1% level. 
c.  Eq 2.4, 2.5 and 2.6 use White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance.  
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Figure 3 Government expenditure by function (% of GDP) 
Source: China Statistic Yearbook, 1996-2003
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Figure 5 Government revenue, expenditure and balance as a percentage of GDP 
Source: China Statistic Yearbook, 1996-2003 
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Figure 7 Central and local share of budgetary government revenue and expenditure 
Source: China Statistic Yearbook, 1996-2003
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Table 1 Empirical literature of Leviathan hypotheses 
Author(s) Size of government 
Leviathan 
hypotheses 
Measurement 
Level of 
observation units 
Time Result 
Oates (1972) Taxes/national income Decentralization Central taxes/total taxes 57 countries 1972 No 
Sjoquist (1982) GOVE per capita Fragmentation Number of jurisdiction in an SMSA 
48 southern 
SMSAs, US 
1972 Yes 
Subnational taxes/personal 
income 
Decentralization 
Fragmentation  
Collusion  
State GOVR (GOVE)/subnational GOVR(GOVE) 
Number of local government units 
Intergovernmental grants/subnational GOVR 
48 states, US 1977 
No 
No 
Yes  Oates (1985) 
GOVR/GDP 
Decentralization 
Collusion  
Central GOVR (GOVE)/total GOVR (GOVE) 
Intergovernmental grants/total GOVR 
43 countries 1982 
No 
Yes  
Schneider (1986) GOVE per capita Fragmentation 
Number of suburban municipalities in an SMSA per 
100,000 capita 
757 suburban 
municipalities in 
46 SMSAs, US 
1972-77 Yes 
Nelson (1986) 
Subnational tax per capita 
Subnational tax/personal 
income 
Decentralization 
Fragmentation 
State taxes/total subnational taxes 
Population per county (special district) 
49 states, US 1976 
No  
Yes(No) 
Nelson (1987) 
Subnational taxes 
(GOVE)/personal income 
Fragmentation Number of general-purpose (single-) units per capita 50 states, US 1977 Yes (No) 
Wallis&Oates 
(1988) 
Subnational GOVR 
(GOVE)/per capita 
income 
Decentralization State GOVR (GOVE)/subnational GOVR (GOVE) 48 states, US 1902-1982 Yes (Yes) 
2900 counties, US Yes (No) Eberts&Gronberg 
(1988) 
GOVE/personal income Fragmentation 
Number of general-purpose (single-) units, per capita, 
per square mile 280 SMSAs, US 
1977 
Yes (No) 
Marlow (1988) GOVE/GNP Decentralization Subnational GOVE/total GOVE US 1946-1985 Yes 
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Zax (1989) 
County GOVR/personal 
income 
Decentralization 
Fragmentation 
County GOVR/total local GOVR 
Number of general-purpose (single-) governments per 
1000 capita 
3022 counties 1982 
Yes 
Yes (No) 
Forbes&Zampelli 
(1989) 
County taxes/income, 
county taxes per capita, 
county GOVR/income, 
county GOVR per capita 
Fragmentation Number of counties in an SMSA 
345 counties in 
157 SMSAs, US 
1977 No 
Raimondo (1989) 
GOVE/personal income 
(e.g. six forms) 
Collusion 
Federal-funded GOVE/state-local GOVE 
Local-funded GOVE/state-local GOVE 
50 states, US 
1960, 1970, 
1980 
Yes 
Grossman (1989a) GOVE/GNP 
Decentralization 
Collusion 
Subnational GOVE/total GOVE 
Federal grants/subnational GOVR 
US 1946-1986 
Yes 
Yes 
Subnational 
GOVR/personal income 
Collusion 
Fragmentation  
Per capita state-to-local transfers 
Population per multiple function government 
48 states, US 1976-77 
Yes 
No Grossman (1989b) 
GOVR/GNP Collusion Per capita federal grants US 1948-1984 Yes 
Joulfain&Marlow 
(1990) 
GOVE/GSP 
Decentralization 
Fragmentation 
Collusion 
Subnational GOVE/total GOVE 
Number of local governments 
Federal grants/subnational GOVE 
50 states, US 1981, 1984 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Eberts&Gronberg 
(1990) 
Own-source GOVR 
(GOVE)/personal income 
Fragmentation Number of local jurisdictions 218 SMSAs, US 1977 Yes 
Joulfaian&Marlow 
(1991) 
GOVE/GSP 
Per capita GOVE 
Decentralization 
Fragmentation 
Collusion 
Subnational GOVE/total GOVE( Local 
GOVE/subnational GOVE) 
Number of local governments  
Federal grants/subnational GOVE 
48 states, US 1983-1985 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Heil (1991) GOVE (GOVR)/GDP Decentralization 
Central GOVR (GOVE)/total GOVR (GOVE) 
Dummy variable for federal structure 
22 OECD and 39 
IMF countries 
1985 
No (No) 
No 
Grossman (1992) GOVE/GDP Decentralization Central (state/local) GOVE/total GOVE Australia 1950-1984 No (No) 
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Collusion Grants/total state-local GOVR Yes 
Grossman&West 
(1994) 
GOVE/GNP 
Decentralization 
Collusion 
Central (province/local) GOVE/total GOVE 
Grants/total provincial-local GOVR 
Canada 1958-1987 
Yes 
Yes 
Anderson&van 
Den Berg (1998) 
GOVR/GDP Decentralization Central GOVR (GOVE)/total GOVR (GOVE) 45 countries 1990 Yes (Yes) 
Stein (1999) GOVE/GDP 
Decentralization 
Collusion 
Subnational GOVE/total GOVE 
Local program financed by central funds 
19 Latin American 
and some OECD 
countries 
Average 
1990-1995 
No 
Yes  
Shadbegian (1999) GOVE/GSP 
Decentralization 
Collusion 
State and local own-purpose GOVE/total GOVE 
Central-state and state-local grants/total state-local 
GOVR 
48 states, US 1979-1992 
Yes 
Yes 
Moesen&van 
Cauwenberge 
(2000) 
GOVE/GDP Decentralization Local taxes/total GOVE 
19 OECD 
countries 
1990-1992 Yes 
de Mello (2001) Per capita GOVE 
Decentralization 
Fragmentation 
Collusion 
Rayon’s GOVR (GOVE)/total GOVR (GOVE) 
Number of cities and communes in rayon 
Per capita grants 
38 rayons, 
Moldova 
1998 
Yes (Yes) 
Yes 
Yes 
Jin&Zou (2002) GOVE/GDP 
Decentralization 
Collusion 
Subnational GOVR (GOVE)/total GOVR (GOVE) 
Central grants/subnational GOVE 
17 industrial and 
15 developing 
countries 
1980-1994 
Yes (No) 
Yes 
Decentralization 
Collusion 
Own-source subnational revenue/total revenue 
Grants/total GOVR 
44 countries 1978-1997 
No 
Yes 
Decentralization 
Collusion 
Own-source subnational revenue/total revenue 
Grants/total GOVR 
25 countries 1980-1993 
No 
Yes 
Rodden (2003) GOVE/GDP 
Decentralization 
Collusion 
subnational revenue/total revenue 
Grants/total GOVR 
18 OECD 
countries 
Average 
1985-95 
Yes 
Yes 
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Kwon (2003) GOVE/GDP 
Decentralization 
Collusion 
Local GOVE/total GOVE 
Central-to-local grants 
Korea 1979-2001 
Yes 
Yes 
Feld et al (2003) Per capita GOVR 
Decentralization 
Fragmentation 
Collusion 
Communal GOVR/ subnational GOVR per capita 
Number of communes per capita 
Net central-to-canton grants per capita 
26 Swiss cantons 1980-1998 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
205 counties, US 
No 
Yes 
Campbell (2004) Per capita GOVE 
Decentralization 
Fragmentation 
Own GOVE/ municipalities and counties GOVE 
Number of units per 100,000 capita 665 
municipalities, US 
1982 
Yes 
No 
Note: 
GOVE: Government expenditure, GOVR: Government revenue, GSP: Gross state product, GDP: Gross domestic product, GNP: Gross national product. 
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